Abstract. The implementation of security protocols is challenging and error-prone. A model-driven development approach allows the automatic generation of an application, from a simpler and abstract model that can be formally verified. Our AnBx compiler is a tool for automatic generation of Java code of security protocols specified in the Alice&Bob notation. In contrast with existing tools, it uses a simpler specification language and computes the consistency checks that agents have to perform on reception of messages. Moreover, the tool applies various optimization strategies to achieve efficiency both at compile and run time.
Introduction
The implementation of security protocols is challenging and error-prone, as experience has shown [1] that even widely used and heavily tested protocols like TLS and SSH need to be patched every year due to low-level implementation bugs. The critical aspect is that the high-level security properties of a protocol must be hard-coded explicitly, in terms of low-level cryptographic operations and checks of well-formedness. To counter this problem, in this work we consider a model-driven development approach that allows automatic generation of an application, from a simpler and abstract model that can be formally verified. We present the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator 1 , a tool for automatic generation of Java code of security protocols specified in the simple Alice&Bob (AnB) notation [2] , suitable for agile prototyping. Despite being intuitive, AnB is semi-formal because it contains a lot of implicit concepts. In particular, it does not say explicitly which (defensive) consistency checks on the received data need to be performed to verify that the protocol is running according to the specification. It is important to recognize that while some checks on reception are trivially derived from the narrations (verification of a digital signature, comparison of agent's identities), others are more complex and managing them can be a challenging task even for an expert programmer.
In addition to the main contribution of an end-to-end AnB to Java compiler, we also present an improved way to compute the checks on reception with respect to a previous solution proposed by Briais and Nestmann [3] . This allows reducing the compilation time (in one case even from days to seconds), preventing space state explosion problems in the optimization phase, and increasing the execution speed. The tool also supports the AnBx language [4] , an extension of AnB to be employed for a purely declarative modelling of distributed protocols.
The AnBx Compiler
The automatic Java code generation of security protocols comprises several phases. A detailed description of the architecture of the tool, which is developed in Haskell, is given in [5] and can be summarized as follows: Pre-processing and Verification AnBx → AnB → (verification) The AnBx protocol is lexed, parsed and then compiled to AnB, a format suitable for verification with the external tool OFMC [6], a state of the art model checker. The compiler can also read protocols directly in AnB. AnBx and its translation to AnB have already been described in [4, 7] .
Front-End AnB → ExecNarr → Opt-ExecNarr
If the protocol is deemed safe by the model checker, the AnB specification can be compiled into an executable narration (ExecNarr ), a set of action that gives an interpretation on how the protocol participants are expected to execute the protocol. The core of this phase is the automatic generation of the consistency checks derived from the static information of protocol narrations. The optimized executable narration (Opt-ExecNarr ) goes further in this direction and applies some optimization techniques, including common subexpression elimination (CSE), which in general are useful to generate efficient code.
Back-End Opt-ExecNarr → (protocol logic) + (application logic) → Java
The final result of the compilation is the generation of the Java source code from the Opt-ExecNarr . The previous phases are fully language independent and do not require any adaptation in case another programming language is used. But even in the back-end we postponed any language dependent decision in order to increase the compiler's portability and simplify the re-targeting.
Executable Narrations and Optimization
The computation of the checks on reception is done by extending and refining the ideas proposed in [3] . In short, three kinds of checks are considered in formulas on received messages: equality [E = F ] on expressions denoting the comparison of two bit-streams, E and F ; well-formedness [E] denoting the verification of whether the projections and decryption contained in E are likely to succeed; inversion inv(E, F ) denoting the verification that E and F evaluate to inverse messages. Since consistency checks operate on (message,expression) pairs, the representation of the agent's knowledge must be generalized. The underlying idea is that a pair (M, E) denotes that an expression E is equivalent to the message M . For this reason is it necessary to introduce the notion of knowledge sets,
